




**HELLENIC REPUBLIC**  
**MINISTRY of INTERIOR**



**GENERAL SECRETARIAT**  
**FOR CIVIL PROTECTION**



**HELLENIC-SWEDISH COOPERATION**

*SENIOR OFFICERS WORKSHOP*

14-15 October 2008, Athens

Organized

By

Hellenic General Secretariat for Civil Protection

and

Swedish Rescue Agency

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## *Foreword*

Since the 60's forest fires have become a major concern in many European Member States. The 2007 and the last summer devastating fires ravaged parts of Southern Europe and the United States- a reminder that forest fires are an ever-present risk to people and the environment, worldwide.

The understanding of fires, how they propagate, and how they may be controlled requires multidisciplinary expertise. Scientific research has been contributing to furthering the knowledge and developing improved technologies for forest fire reduction. The European Commission has been supporting multi-national research in this area since the mid 80's. Through several research programs, workshops and seminars, considerable advances have been made since then in fire behaviour modeling, fire risk mapping, fire management and monitoring, fire suppression techniques and post-fire damage assessment.

The majority of the European forest fires experience relates to forest fires in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean basin is particularly vulnerable to forest fires due to its high population densities, intense seasonal pressure, and hot and dry summers, and has been considered a sensitive area in Europe. Fire risk in this region is exacerbated by the possible impact of climate change.

The Hellenic General Secretariat for Civil Protection and the Swedish Rescue Agency organized on the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> October 2008 in Athens, a Senior Officers Workshop entitled "*International Assistance Management and Joint Task Forces in Forest Fires*".

The purpose of this two-day workshop was to disseminate the results of this major topic which is still an open critical question for the European Civil Protection Mechanism, to a wide range of stakeholders, including operational authorities, researchers, decision makers, fire fighters etc.

The workshop was an opportunity to share knowledge and expertise about fires at an international scale. Actually, only exchanges of experience between all people involved in the forest firefighting will make possible new developments. To that extent, operational and tactical level experience plays a major part if it relies on an appropriate multi-national fighting strategy. At this stage, the research plays an essential part. It was then logical that a 2-days workshop was dedicated to this subject in order to present an accurate State-of-the-Art of work in progress on different topics. It is also an opportunity to pay homage to all the lectures for the efficient work they perform, often behind the scenes. We have to warmly congratulate them.

*Gen (ret) Margaritis Mouzas  
Secretary General  
Hellenic General Secretariat for Civil Protection*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The **Hellenic General Secretariat for Civil Protection and the Swedish Rescue Agency** organized on the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> October 2008 in Athens, a Senior Officers Workshop entitled “*International Assistance Management and Joint Task Forces in Forest Fires*”.

The scope of the workshop was to record and analyze the experience of the Hellenic Civil Protection Mechanism regarding the management of the International Assistance which mobilized to Hellas during the catastrophic period of August 2007.

The workshop focused in a particular period of the 2007 Forest Fire period, at the end of August. During this period, the Hellenic Government requested assistance mainly through the E.U. Mechanism of Civil Protection but also, through the activation of bilateral cooperation's such as with France and Russia. It is known this day, that this *unfamiliar assistance* was the biggest ever mobilized for forest fires inside E.U. The number of the participant countries, the number and the different categories of aerial means and the number of ground forces created within the tactical level, a multi-national and multi-agencies mechanism. The management of such a complicate mechanism and the lessons learned is of an essential meaning for the European Civil Protection.

## 2. HELLENIC 2007 FIRE SEASON: general description

Forest fires represent one of the most important risks faced by citizens in Hellas during every summer. The 2007 year was characterized as one of the most difficult year in the facing of forest fires because during the previous autumn and winter the rainfall levels were the lowest of the last decades. The above weather conditions in combination with (3) major heat waves –within the 2007 fire season – caused one the major catastrophe with human casualties at the end of August.

*In 2007 Greece experienced the worst year on record for forest fires:*

- **Human Casualties:**
  - (69) people lost their lives
  - (9) seasonal forest fire-fighters and (2) pilots were killed
- **Losses of properties:**
  - (1.710) buildings burned down or were rendered uninhabitable
  - (160) villages were burned
- **Environmental Impact by 31<sup>th</sup> of August 2007:**
  - (12.016) total number of forest fires
  - (261.504) hectares of land burned
  - (180 000) hectares of land burned between 24<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> of August 2007
  - (11.2%) of this land was on NATURA 2000 sites
  - (56%) Forest and Natural area

- (42%) agricultural fields and crops
- (2%) human made area (villages, roads, terrains etc)
- **Estimated economical impact:**
  - Human drift-wood > 500.000 people
  - Total Cost: 3.5 B Euros
  - Total Mission Cost : 600 M Euros

The period before the 2007 Fire Season characterized by unusually long periods of extremely high temperatures causing conditions of prolonged heat wave, prolonged drought of previous months, very low levels of humidity and very strong dry winds.

The Meteorological Conditions during Fire Season 2007 characterized by extremely hot temperatures and below normal rainfall across southeast Europe, led to numerous wildfires in nearly every country in the region. As a result, Hellas has suffered (3) intensive heat waves from June to August 2007 with the most severe ones dating from June 21-27 and July 21-25 with temperatures rising to more than 46 degrees.

In the “*June-July Forest Fires Log Book*” was registered:

- More than 100 fires erupted across the country.
- A major wildfire broke out in the Mountain of Parnitha near Athens.
- By the dawn of June 29<sup>th</sup>, a significant part of the popular Parnitha National Park had turned into ashes.
- More than 30.000 hectares of wild land in the north of Hellas, on the island of Crete, in Korinthos and Achaia prefectures and around Athens.

On the 23<sup>d</sup> of August 2007, a number of uncontrollable forest fires faced the whole South Hellas and the Island of Evia. The conditions at the end of August 2007 were as follows:

- The meteorological conditions before the Fire Season and the (3) heat waves had created extreme weather conditions for the forest fires.
- The number of the forest fires which were initiated during the June-July period, they left products with strong impact in the environment.
- The Forest Fire Fighting Mechanism was exhausted by the continuous, long period operations.
- The philological impact to the population was serious.

Under the above conditions, on Saturday 24<sup>th</sup> of August 2007, *the Hellenic Government declared a “State of Emergency”*.

So, at the end of August, Hellas became the first picture in the International Community and in all the International Media due to:

- the extend of the catastrophe
- the number of casualties
- the scale of the International Assistance which was deployed ever in E.U.

### 3. 2007 FOREST FIRES SEASON: the national resources

The national 2007 Forest Fires Mechanism consisted of:

#### 3.a.Aerial Means

- HELLENIC AIR FORCE:
  - (21) CANADAIR
  - (21) PZL and GRUMMAN
- FIRE CORPS AERIAL MEANS SQ:
  - (2) SUPER PUMA helicopters
  - (3) BK-117 helicopters
- FIRE CORPS AERIAL MEANS under leasing contract:
  - (19) special fire-fighting helicopters (MI-26, S-64F, KA-32)
  - (1) Be-200 fire fighting aircraft

#### 3.b.Ground Forces

- 7.310 Fire-Fighters (FIRE CORPS)
- 3.000 Soldiers (ARMED FORCES)
- (200) Volunteers (FIRE CORPS)
- Hundreds of volunteers (G.S.C.P.)
- Hundreds of active citizens

### 4. 2007 INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE: request and activation

The Hellenic Government activated the E.U. Mechanism for Civil Protection (4) times during the 2007 Fire Season:

#### 4.1. (27 June – 2 July Emergency)

Request	Assistance accepted	Affected Areas
(4) Canadairs	(7) Canadairs	Attica (Parnitha)
(3) Heavy Helicopters	Italy, France, Portugal, Spain	Region of Thessaly (Mount Pelion)

#### 4.2. (5 July – 6 July Emergency)

Request	Assistance accepted	Affected Areas
(6) Canadairs (3) Heavy Helicopters	(2) Canadairs, Italy	Fires in Attica (Mount Parnitha) Region of Thessaly (Mount Pelion)

#### 4.3. (18 July – 1 August Emergency)

Request	Assistance accepted	Affected Areas
(4) Canadairs	(11) Canadairs France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.	Korinthos, Patras, Mani (in the Peloponnese) Kithira Island Kefallinia Island

Additional assistance from Russia: (3) fire fighting aircraft ((1) plane B-200 and (2) helicopters). These aircraft stayed in Greece for the rest of the fire season

#### 4.4. (24 August – 5 September Emergency)

Request	Assistance accepted	Affected Areas
(8) fire-fighting aircrafts were initially requested, but this request was increased due to the conditions	(10) Canadairs, (3) Pilatus planes and (12) Helicopters More than 400 specialists were also on site, including aircraft crew, fire-fighters, logisticians, etc.	Large areas of Hellas, ranging from the island of Evia north of Athens to the Peloponnese in the south.

#### 4.5. AUGUST 2007: statistics

##### 4.5.1. AERIAL MEANS: international resources

Country	No	Aircraft		Helicopters	Arrival	Air - Base
FRANCE	4	CL-415			25/8/2007	Elefsis
NETHERLANDS			3	SUPER PUMA-120	27/8/2007	Tripoli
ITALY	1	CL-415			25/8/2007	Elefsis
SERBIA	7	6 PZL, 1 AN-2			28/8/2007	Epitalio
GERMANY	1	C 160	3	3 S-53 (Sikorski)	28/8/2007	Andravida
ROMANIA			1	Mi-8	27/8/2007	Elefsis
NORWAY			1	B-412	28/8/2007	Tatoi
SLOVENIA			1	BELL-412	26/8/2007	Tatoi
SPAIN	4	CL-415			26/8/2007	Elefsis
SWITZERLAND			4	SUPER PUMA-120	27/8/2007	Kalamata
PORTUGAL	1	CL-215			28/8/2007	Elefsis
AUSTRIA	3	PC-6	2	BELL-212	27/8/2007	Elefsis
TURKEY	1	CL-215			27/8/2007	Elefsis
SWEDEN			1	AB-205	30/8/2007	Tatoi
CROATIA	1				29/8/2007	Elefsis
RUSSIA	1	B 200			30/8/2007	Elefsis
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>24</b>		<b>16</b>			



<b>E.U. &amp; 3d Countries: FLEET FLYING WORK</b>				
<b>TYPE NUMBER</b>	<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>PERIOD</b>	<b>TOTAL FLYING TIME</b>	<b>AREA OF OPERATIONS</b>
(4) CL 415	FRANCE	26/08/2007 έως 03/09/2007	167:33'	ALIVERI-AMARINTHOS-SETA-MISTROS-EVIA-ASKRI-VIOTIA-SOFIKO KORINTHIAS-ISARI-AKOBO-KARTENA MARKADIA-HOLARGOS-ANCIENT OLYMPIA-MATESI- KAKOUREIKA ILIAS GRAMMATIKO ATTIKHS PARNONAS - AGRIANI LAKONIAS
(1) CL 415	ITALY	26/08/2007 έως 29/08/2007	20:39'	SOFIKO KORINTHIAS SETA - MISTROS EVIA
2 CL 415	SPAIN	27/08/2007 έως 02/09/2007	82:20'	MISTROS EVIA AGRIANI LAKONIAS PARNONAS LAKONIAS
1 CL 215	TURKEY	28/08/2007 και 31/08/2007	8:12'	MISTROS EVIA KARYTENA ARKADIA
1 CL 215	PORTUGAL	29/08/2007 έως 31/08/2007	10:56'	MISTROS EVIA KARYTENA ARKADIA
2 PCX	AUSTRIA	28/08/2007 έως 30/08/2007	17:28'	MARMARI – STOUPEI - SETA EVIA
1 CL 415	CROATIA	30/08/2007 έως 02/09/2007	19:14'	KARYTENA ARKADIA AGRIANI LAKONIAS PARNONAS LAKONIAS
1 BE-200	RUSSIA	31/08/2007 01/09/2007 05/09/2007 06/09/2007 08/09/2007 09/09/2007	20:34'	PARNONAS – AGRIANI LAKONIAS KAFIONA AREOPOLIS KARIES KORINTHIAS KARATHONAS NAFPLIOU DREPANO – NAOUSA TAYGETOS
6 PZL	SERBIA	01/09/2007 έως 04/09/2007	52:04'	PERSENA - GIANITSOHORI - SMERNA - PRASIDAKI - KARMIO - VRINA - KATO SAMIKO - FOLOI - NEOHORI - FIGALIA - KOURTESI ILIAS KARYTENA - MEGALOPOLI – RIZOSPILIA - KASTANOHORI - HOREMI ARKADIAS
2 BELL-212	AUSTRIA	28/08/2007 έως 31/08/2007	25:55'	MARMARI - STOUPEI - SETA - HARAKAS EVIA
1 BELL-214	NORWAY	28/08/2007 έως 01/09/2007	13:52'	MARMARI - STOUPEI - SETA - HARAKAS - MISTROS EVIA
1 BELL-412	SLOVENIA	28/08/2007 έως 30/08/2007	7:02'	MARMARI-STOUPEI EVIA
2 MI-9	ROMANIA	28/08/2007 και 01/09/2007	24:37'	SETA - STOUPEI - MISTROS EVIA GRAMMATIKO ATTIKIS
3 S-53	GERMANY	28/08/2007 έως 31/08/2007 και 02/09/2007	79:32'	PLOUTOHORI-DIASELA- THISOA - PERSENA - FOLOI - LALA ILIAS-GERAKI AMALIADAS - ANDRAVIDA ILIAS-RIZOSPILIA ARKADIAS TAYGETOS - VORDONIA LAKONIAS
2 BO 105 (βοηθητικά)	GERMANY	2/09/2007	3:46'	RIZOSPILIA ARKADIAS TAYGETOS - VORDONIA LAKONIAS ANDRAVIDA ILIAS
3 SUPER PUMA	SWITZERLAND	28/08/2007 έως 04/09/2007	94:57'	TAYGETOS DIAVOLITSI - NEDOUSA - PEFKO - POLIANI - FARAGI - RINDOMO - KORFOVOUNI - RIZANA - KAMBOS AVIAS MESSINIAS ISARI - AGRIAKONA - KASTANOHORI PARADISIA MEGALOPOLI ARKADIAS - AGRIANI - VORDONIA LAKONIAS
2 SUPER PUMA	HOLLAND	28/08/2007 έως 03/09/2007	97:25'	MEGALOPOLI KARYTENA – ISARI - AKOVO - AGRIAKONA - KAMARA ARKADIAS AGRIANI - PIGADIA LAKONIAS AETOS - KORFOVOUNI MESSINIAS
1 BEL-205	SWEDEN	31/08/2007 01/09/2007	7:31'	MISTROS - HARAKAS EVIA

#### 4.5.2. GROUND FORCES

COUNTRY	ARRIVAL	PERSONNEL	ENGINEERS
CYPRUS	26/8/2007	59	6
CYPRUS	27/8/2007	72	8
FRANCE	26/8/2007	64	
FRANCE	29/8/2007	8	
ISRAEL	27/8/2007	60	
HUNGARY	27/8/2007	19	5
ALBANIA	28/8/2007	4	1
SERBIA	30/8/2007	55	7
BULGARIA	31/8/2007	45	5
INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTEERS' TEAM	27/8/2007	7	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>402</b>	<b>32</b>

#### 5. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT: C3

##### 5.1. GENERAL

The Hellenic involved Authorities managed the situation based on the National Legislation for forest fires and Major Crisis Management:

- **Suggestion of the Request:**
  - Fire Corps
- **Activation of the Mechanism-Communication with M.I.C.:**
  - G.S.C.P.
- **Acceptance:**
  - Fire Corps
- **Coordination of the arrivals:**
  - G.S.C.P.
- **Reception of the foreign forces:**
  - Fire Corps
  - Hellenic Air Force
- **Decision for the engagement of the foreign forces:**
  - Fire Corps
- **Tactical Level C2:**
  - Fire Corps
  - Hellenic Air Force
- **Accommodation, Logistics**
  - Fire Corps
  - Hellenic Air Force
  - Local Authorities
- **Decision for the engagement of the foreign forces:**
  - Fire Corps

## 5.2. KEY ROLE PARAMETERS

The Management realized in (3) individual levels:

- **Strategic Level:**
  - General Secretariat for Civil Protection.
- **Operational Level:**
  - National Operational Centre of General Secretariat for Civil Protection.
  - National Operational Center of Fire Corps.
  - National Operational Center of National Defense General Staff.
  - National Operational Center of Hellenic Air Force.
  - Hellenic Police.
  - National Health Operational Center.
  - National Center of Emergency Care.
- **Tactical Level:**
  - Fire Corps.
  - Hellenic Air Force.
  - Armed Forces.
  - Hellenic Police.
  - National Center of Emergency Care.
  - Local Authorities.

The main responsibilities by law and tasks per level were:

- **STRATEGIC LEVEL:**
  - The General Secretary for Civil Protection decided to which country or International Organization to address the request.
  - The Chief of the Fire Corps decided the acceptance or not of the offers.
- **OPERATIONAL LEVEL:**
  - **NATIONAL OPERATIONAL CENTER of G.S.C.P.:**
    - Activation of the International Assistance Mechanism.
    - Activation of E.U. Mechanism.
    - Receipt the requests from the Fire Corps.
    - Coordination of the accepted forces.
    - Daily communication with M.I.C.
    - Provision of SITREPs to M.I.C. and to Foreign Embassies.
  - **NATIONAL OPERATIONAL CENTER OF FIRE CORPS:**
    - Organization of the reception of the foreign forces.
    - Organization of the information network.
    - Organization of the accommodation of the foreign forces.
    - Deployment of the foreign forces.
    - Monitoring of the operations.

- C2.
- Provision of SITREPs to G.S.C.P.
- **NATIONAL OPERATIONAL CENTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF:**
  - Provision of logistic support to the Fire Corps.
- **NATIONAL OPERATIONAL CENTER OF HELLENIC AIR FORCE:**
  - Organization of the reception of the foreign aerial means:
    - Allocation of the aerial means by type (amphibians, helicopters)
  - Coordination of the aerial fire fighting operations .
  - Organization of the logistics.
  - Monitoring of the operations.
  - Provision of SITREPs to Fire Corps.
  - Flight Safety.
- **HELLENIC POLICE:**
  - Provision of support to the Fire Corps:
    - Drivers
    - Buses
    - Cars
    - Accommodation
  - Development of Security Measurements in the critical areas.
  - Reservation of security in case of evacuation.
- **NATIONAL HEALTH OPERATIONAL CENTER:**
  - Coordination of the National Health System.
  - Deployment of Medical Units.
  - Provision of medical care.
  - Monitoring the health of the population.
- **NATIONAL CENTER OF EMERGENCY CARE (EKAB):**
  - EKAB mission was to support and reinforce the local services with ambulances and personnel.
  - Because of the dimension and intensity of the event the Special Unit for Disaster Medicine was also deployed from Athens HQ.
  - EKAB response consisted in dealing with short term health issues such as trauma, burns and smoke inhalation, evacuation of elderly, children and handicapped persons, transportation of injured persons to local hospitals and to burn units located in Athens.

- **TACTICAL LEVEL:**
  - **FIRE CORPS**
    - Reception of the Forces
    - Communication with the team leaders
    - Exact presentation of the situation
    - C2 tactical operational management of the forces
    - Redeployment of Fire Corps Officers from the fires as LNOs and Chief in Command with the foreign teams
  - **HELLENIC AIR FORCE:**
    - Briefing of the crews-Mission tasking:
      - Aerial means capabilities
      - Aerial means availability
      - Type & attribute of fire
      - Fire area conditions
      - Distance from base and water scooping area
    - Maintenance.
    - Common Operations:
      - Fire Fighting Tactics
      - Severalty
      - Command of the Joint Fleet
      - Areas of water scooping
      - Coordination of drops
      - Communications
        - Between aerial means and traffic control
        - Between aerial means and ground forces
        - Common phraseology
      - Crews Familiarization with local procedures.
      - Formation Coherence.
      - Flight restriction, safety & crew rest status.
      - Tactics and specific techniques of the foreign formations.
      - Fire area coordination

### 5.3. C2 of JOINT OPERATIONS

The *National Operational Center of Fire Corps* (199 S.E.K.I.P.S.) is responsible to mobilize and to co-ordinate all the fire fighting forces needed to deal with any kind of emergency throughout the country, according to the Fire Corps mission.

The 199 S.E.K.I.P.S. is also responsible to collaborate with all the agencies involved, such as the General Secretariat for Civil Protection, Local Authorities, Security and Armed Forces (Police, Coast Guard, Army, Navy, Air Force) etc., in case of emergency (earthquakes, floods, forest fires, technological and natural disasters).

The *Forest Fires Coordinating Center* (F.F.C.C./S.K.E.D.) operates during the forest fire season, as a special branch of the 199 S.E.K.I.P.S. Its mission is to deploy and to coordinate all the national and rented air fire fighting forces (aircrafts and helicopters) for the suppression of forest fires

throughout the country. In case of major events, the F.F.C.C. could deploy ground forces from one regional commandment to another depending on the risk assessment.

During the critical period of August 2007, the foreign aerial means placed between the national aerial means. The Joint Fleet engaged in the operations under the operational command and control of F.F.C.C. and based on the national rules and regulations.

According to the situation, the Chief of the Fire Corps decided the implementation of an *ad-hoc* plan, similar to the Specific Operational plan which was prepared for the Olympic Games.

He nominated (4) Officers (2 per day) as LNOs

- One as a Logistic Officer at the Fire Corps HQs
- One as an Operational Officer at the 199 S.E.K.I.P.S.

This *ad-hoc* plan and his order for the establishment of a “specific” communication line between the foreign team leaders and the Fire Corps Seniority, they were the key-role parameters.

For the Foreign Forces, the Chief of the Fire Corps had the final decision:

- For the mission (fire, area)
- For the end of their mission

The foreign ground forces operated always within a certain sector of the forest fire. They operated always under the Command of a National Officer. They had strong cooperation with the Greek Fire Fighters. *Particularly, the Fire Corps managed the foreign teams as Greek Teams and they introduced them completely into to the National Operational Plans.*

## **6. LESSONS LEARNED-PROBLEMS**

A number of problems were recorded.

### **6.1. NATIONAL OPERATIONAL CENTER of G.S.C.P.**

- Hundreds of phone calls from tourists and travel agencies from all over the world.
- Reports for the M.I.C. were sent out to the Greek embassies in some countries in Europe.
- Some foreign embassies were in contact with us on a daily basis..
- Several requests for interviews from the international media.
- Keep informed the countries about the daily program of their means.
- SITUATION REPORTS – PROBLEMS
- Sometimes the officers were asked for more situation reports per day. Also to include more information.

- It occurred that the officers couldn't gather the information. As an example: which individual aircraft is acting and where or departing!
- The structure of the situation report was prepared ad-hoc. There wasn't a form of a MIC situation report in English.
- Language problems and problems related to personnel.
- A lot of time was needed to gather the information and prepare the situation report (when a lot of other work had to be done)
- Interviews to the international media.
- Answers to a lot of offers (humanitarian, money) from countries that we received mainly through the Ministry of Foreign affairs.
- Unfamiliar paper work.
- Problems in relation with the media: As an example the interview with BBC through MIC: Questions like "What is Greece going to do with the problem of forest fires?" simply can not be answered before an assessment is finished!!!!
- Problems in relation with the offers: It occurred that offers (aircraft, teams or humanitarian aid) came and there was no information who called for this assistance and who accepted the offers!!!

## **6.2. NATIONAL OPERATIONAL CENTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE GENERAL STAFF**

- There was no prior experience to facing such an extensive and vast case of natural disaster.
- For the first time, the Armed Forces contributed such great numbers of personnel and equipment and means for a mission outside their primary operational task.
- Central control and local command of personnel and means for missions outside primary operational task is needed.

## **6.3. FIRE CORPS**

- The redeployment of Fire Corps Officers from the fires as LNOs and Chiefs in Command with the foreign teams caused the absence from the fires a number of more than (30) experienced officers.
- Most of the ground forces came from South Europe, that means that they had experience in Forest Fires that were similar to our once. But not all of them. In some cases, the foreign fire fighters had no experience in serious forest fires.
- The magnitude of the assistance was unfamiliar. The accommodation of the forces was unfamiliar too.
- The small, regional and local Fire Stations weren't able to provide accommodation, logistic and food. They didn't have enough personnel for such a task.
- The common operational language was a reality only between the amphibian's pilots.
- The pilots of the helicopters had different level of experience. Some of them, although certified pilots, they didn't have any experience in aerial forest fire fighting.

- The role of the Media was critical. They dispersed panic and as a result, the F.F.C.C. had to manage several phone calls from the Embassies.
- The Joint Ground Forces operated as an “exact” Joint Module only in one case. The common structure, philosophy and training in mountain operations of the Hellenic and French special units were the key role parameters for the effective joint operations.
- Most of the ground operations were common and not joint due to the language problems, different equipment, different level of experience and in some cases due to different tactics.

#### **6.4. HELLENIC AIR FORCE**

The main problems were:

- The different level of experience among the helicopter pilots:
  - Different types
  - Different experience
  - Different tactics
- Communication problems due to the different operational frequencies between the foreign aerial means.

#### **6.5. NATIONAL CENTER OF EMERGENCY CARE**

- The difficulties that were encountered by EKAB personnel were:
  - Unsafe environment due to forest fire but also because of not knowing the region.
  - The area was unknown and vast.
  - The information received regarding possible casualties and needs was not accurate.
  - There were problems regarding communication issues with fire services and local authorities (different communication systems, different networks)
- Regarding the support from other European countries through MIC, we had no direct information but we had to provide on spot assistance to Cypriot Fire Services team member.
- As lessons learned we can point out the need of a unified command coordination and communication center for all involved agencies (Hellenic and EU member countries), the need of joint training and development of joint exercises, especially for E.U. member countries that face the same risks.

#### **7. INITIATIVES by the HELLENIC G.S.C.P.**

The General Secretariat for Civil Protection established in October 2007 a new Master Plan. Mainly, this Master Plan was a result of the 2007 International Assistance Management.



This Master Plan defines (3) levels of cooperation:

**1<sup>st</sup> EUROPEAN LEVEL:**

- Hellas participates with (6) National Modules in the new Mechanism.
- The G.S.C.P. participates in all the E.U. actions and tasks.
- The G.S.C.P. proposed technical specifications for “forest fires ground modules”
- The G.S.C.P. organized a series of meetings with all the involved Hellenic Authorities regarding the preparation of their participation in the E.U. Mechanism.

**2<sup>d</sup> FIRE 5:**

- The strong intention –in a political level- between France, Spain, Portugal and Italy, to establish a coalition against forest fires. Greece is the 5th member.
- A European project focused on the “ground forest fires modules” and on the “aerial forest fires means” and the needs for training. It is an experimental –real- research.

**3<sup>d</sup> DEVELOPMENT OF STRONG BILATERAL COOPERATIONS**

• **HE-FRA/J1:**

- It is the bilateral cooperation between France and Greece.
- HE-FRA/J1 is an example of “experts modules”.
- Most of the M-S with forest fires problems, they expect the results of HE-FRA/J1 as a reference for the “ground forest fires modules”.
- WHY; Because Greece and France are the only EU countries with “compatible models” and “common experience”.

*The organization of the HE-SW 2008 workshop is an implementation of the 3d part of this master plan.*

**8. CONCLUSIONS**

Summarized the presentations and the case studies of the workshop, as well as the discussions of the participants during the round tables, the conclusions have as follows:

- The Hellenic Civil Protection Authorities and the Superior Officers managed the International Assistance which arrived in the country under the worst conditions, in the middle of a National Crisis.
- The main ad-hoc International Assistance Management Operational Plans were developed and based on the previous ATHENS 2004 Olympic Games experience.
- A system of LNOs and experienced in international missions officers was the key point for the effective engaged of the foreign forces.

- The Hellenic experience should be shared among the E.U. M-S as a reference point for further exploitation.
- *In case of a Crisis due to natural disasters:*
  - The political decision for an International Assistance request should be timely and accurate.
  - The requests should be accurate and exacts.
  - The description of the situation is of an essential meaning.
  - The provided offers should be have as a key role parameter the “Quality” and not the “Quantity”.
  - The deployment and mobilized foreign forces should be experienced in forest fires.
- *The affected country should have a level of preparedness:*
  - International Assistance Management Legislation.
  - Operational Plans.
  - SOPs for the involved authorities and agencies.
  - Integrated Plans.
  - Unified Command and Control.
- *The cycle of an effective International Assistance Management takes in procedures for:*
  - Request.
  - Offers.
  - Acceptance.
  - Reception.
  - Engaged.
  - Information.
  - Monitoring.
  - Disengaged.
- *An International Assistance Management Plan should contain definitions and procedures for the main phases:*
  - **Phase 1: suggestion of the request**
    - Procedures
    - Forms for request SITREPs
  - **Phase 2: acceptance of the offers**
    - Criteria of evaluation
    - Forms of assistance SPECs
  - **Phase 3: reception of the assistance**
    - Establishment of LNOs network
    - Deployment of experienced in International Missions National Officers based on a National Data Base:
      - E.U. Experts

- E.U. Trained Officers
    - FIRE 5 Officers
  - Establishment of an advanced command post for the Briefing of the Team Leaders.
  - Establishment of the accommodation and logistics system.
  - Provision of an edition with the most important data:
    - The main topics of the National Forest Fires model.
    - The main command and control topics.
    - POCs names and phone numbers.
    - Emergency guides and numbers.
  - **Phase 4: operational engagement of the assistance**
    - SOPs for W3 (who, why, where)
  - **Phase 5: joint operations**
    - Establishment of a Local Joint Command Post
    - Briefing with the Regional Commanders
    - Ad-hoc Joint Command procedures in case of emergency
    - Establishment of a secure and safe common communications network
  - **Phase 6: monitoring-informing**
    - SOPs for monitoring the operations
    - SOPs for informing the involved agencies
    - Common SITREPs
  - **Phase 7: disengagement of the assistance**
    - SOPs for the final decision
    - SOPs for the return of the forces
  - **Phase 8: departure of the assistance**
    - SOPs for the departure
    - Protocol and etiquette
  - **Phase 9: end of the operations**
    - Monitoring of the arrival of the forces at their country.
- At the level of the E.U. Mechanism, the International Assistance Management is a complicate task and an open question among the E.U. M-S.
  - ***The Greek experience (as presented specifically during the case studies) shows that E.U. should define and issue the following topics:***
    - (i) Definition of the term “International Assistance Management”.
    - (ii) Definition of the Operational Phases of the International Assistance Management.
    - (iii) E.U. Guidelines for an Effective National Plan.

- (iv) Joint OPCONs for aerial and ground forces.
- (v) Joint TACONs for aerial and ground forces.
- (vi) Joint SOPs.
- (vii) MIC SOPs.
- (viii) MIC SITREPs.
- (ix) Joint Modules Specifications.

## **9. FUTURE TASKS: HELLENIC-SWEDISH COOPERATION**

It is the first time that a country from North Europe and a country from South Europe, M-S of the E.U., that they decided to open a potential dialog focused on forest fires.

As a result of the analysis of this critical for the future of the E.U. Civil Protection Mechanism, topic, both sides decided to propose to the political level the enhancement of further cooperation.

The Hellenic-Swedish cooperation could focus on the following issues:

- The provision of Hellenic forest fires from the Hellenic part to the Swedish part. This could include Host Nation support, crisis communication, logistics.
- The provision of the Swedish SAR and chemical disasters experience to the Hellenic part, sharing of views on the Emergency Management system in a broader sense and our work on methods for Crisis Communication.

The establishment of a Senior Level Joint Working Group is required for the detailed description of the cooperation.

A Joint Working group could be put in place, and this group should consist of experts in the member states. Working tasks of the Joint Group should primarily be to identify areas of cooperation. The group could have its first meeting in Stockholm in February when the new Agency (MSB) has seen the light.

**ATHENS 14-15 OCTOBER 2008**

## **ANNEX I Abbreviations**

<b>C2</b>	Command and Control
<b>C3</b>	Command, Control and Coordination
<b>E.U.</b>	European Union
<b>G.S.C.P.</b>	General Secretariat for Civil Protection
<b>LNO</b>	Liaison Officer
<b>MIC</b>	Monitoring and Information Center
<b>SOP</b>	Standard Operations Procedures
<b>SPEC</b>	Specifications
<b>OPCON</b>	Operational Control
<b>TACON</b>	Tactical Control

## ANNEX II List of Lectures

**1<sup>ST</sup>  
DAY** 14<sup>th</sup> October 2008

8.30-9.00	Registration	
<b>I</b>	<b>Session Chair</b>	<b>Brigadier Gen. Konstantinos PRENTZAS,</b> Commander, O.C./GSCP
9.00-9.30	Welcoming Remarks	<b>Mr Margaritis MOUZAS,</b> Secretary General, Hellenic Secretariat for Civil Protection <b>H.E. Mr Hakan MALMOVIST,</b> Ambassador of Sweden in Athens <b>Mrs Katarina Wislez Berggren,</b> Counselor, Swedish Embassy <b>Mr Hakan AXELSSON,</b> Head of Swedish Delegation
<b>Short Break 5'</b>		
9.35-9.50	Information about the Swedish model and the Swedish expectations of the workshop	<b>Mr Hakan AXELSSON,</b> Head of Swedish Delegation
9.50-10.15	<b>ATHENS 2004:</b> the OPS for International Assistance Management, lessons learnt	<b>Lt General George GALIATSOS</b> Hellenic Police HQs, Invited Lecture <b>Major George TSOUNAKIS</b> Hellenic Police HQs, Invited Lecture
10.15-10.30	Questions	
<b>10.30-11.00 Break</b>		
<b>II</b>	<b>Session Chair</b>	<b>Brigadier Gen. Konstantinos PRENTZAS,</b> Commander, O.C./GSCP
11.00-11.15	The Hellenic Mechanism for Civil Protection	<b>Dr Dimitris ALEXANDRIS,</b> Head of Dpt of National Disasters, Planning, Prevention & Response, GSCP
11.15-11.30	<b>FOREST FIRES 2007:</b> the situation in Hellas	<b>Mr Foivos THEODOROU,</b> Director of Emergency Planning, GSCP
11.30-12.00	<b>FOREST FIRES 2007:</b> the role of GSCP Operational Center and the International Assistance	<b>Lt Colonel (Army) Panagiotis ANASTOPOULOS,</b> Deputy Commander O.C./GSCP
<b>12.00-13.30 Lunch</b>		
<b>III</b>	<b>Session Chair</b>	<b>Mr Foivos THEODOROU,</b> Director of Emergency Planning, GSCP
13.30-14.00	<b>2007 &amp; GSCP:</b> activation of the European Mechanism and cooperation with MIC	<b>Dr Olga KAKALIAGOU</b> Dpt of International Relations, GSCP <b>Dr Dimitris PAGIDAS,</b> Dpt of International Relations, GSCP
14.00-14.30	<b>FOREST FIRES 2007:</b> the role of Fire Corps National Center	<b>Major Ioannis KAPAKIS,</b> Hellenic Fire Corps HQs, Press Officer
14.30-15.00	<b>FOREST FIRES 2007:</b> the role of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff	<b>Lt Colonel (Army) Ioannis VERDIS,</b> National Defense General Staff
<b>15.00-15.30 Break</b>		
<b>IV</b>	<b>Session Chair</b>	<b>Mr Foivos THEODOROU,</b> Director of Emergency Planning, GSCP
15.30-16.00	<b>FOREST FIRES 2007:</b> the role of the National Health Center	<b>Dr Kalliopi SALTERI,</b> National Center of Health Operations
16.00-16.15	<b>FOREST FIRES 2007:</b> the role of the Hellenic National Center of Emergency Care (EKAB)	<b>Dr Anastasia ZYGOURA,</b> Senior Medical Officer, Head of Special Unit for Disaster Management, EKAB
16.15-16.45	<b>FOREST FIRES 2007:</b> the role of the Hellenic Police	<b>Captain Athanassios OPRIANOS,</b> Hellenic Police, O.C./GSCP
16.45-17.15	Round Table Discussion	

**2<sup>ND</sup>  
DAY****15<sup>th</sup> October 2008**

<b>I</b>	<b>Session Chair</b>	<b>Ms Anna PAPAKYRIAKOU</b> Director of International Relations, Volunteerism, Education & Publications, GSCP
<b>09.00-09.30</b>	<b>INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 2007:</b> management of the aerial means	<b>Colonel (HAF) K TSOBANIKOLIDIS</b> 112 Combat Wing
<b>09.30-10.00</b>	<b>INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 2007:</b> management of the ground forces	<b>Major Chris GOLFINOS</b> , Director of Forest Fires, Hellenic Fire Corps HQs
<b>10.00-10.30</b>		<b>Break</b>
<b>10.30-12.00</b>	<b>Case Study I</b> «International Assistance»	<b>Lt Colonel (Army) Panagiotis ANASTOPOULOS</b> , Deputy Commander, O.C./ GSCP <b>Captain Apostolos PARALIKAS</b> , O.C./GSCP
<b>12.00-13.30</b>		<b>Lunch</b>
<b>II</b>	<b>Session Chair</b>	<b>Ms Dimitra ATHANASSOPOULOU</b> , Finance & Administrative Support Director, GSCP
<b>13.30-14.00</b>	<b>Joint Task Forces in Forest Fires:</b> EU Mechanism, FIRE 5	<b>Dr Kelly SAINI, Captain</b> , Assistant to SGCP <b>Dr Olga KAKALIAGOU</b> Dpt of International Relations, GSCP <b>Dr Dimitris PAGIDAS</b> Dpt of International Relations, GSCP
<b>14.00-14.30</b>	<b>Joint Task Forces in Forest Fires:</b> the HE-FRA/1-7 JTF	<b>LT Antonis PANAGIOTAKIS</b> , 1 <sup>st</sup> EMAK, HE-FRA/J1 Member
<b>14.30-15.00</b>		<b>Break</b>
<b>III</b>	<b>Session Chair</b>	<b>Ms Dimitra ATHANASSOPOULOU</b> , Finance & Administrative Support Director, GSCP
<b>15.00-16.00</b>	<b>Case Study II</b> «Mission Sifle»	<b>Dr Kelly SAINI, Captain, Captain</b> , Assistant to SGCP
<b>16.00-17.00</b>	<b>Round Table Discussion</b> <b>HE-SW Conclusions</b>	<b>Anneli BERGHOLM-SODER</b> , Head of Swedish Delegation <b>Dr Kelly SAINI, Captain</b> , Assistant to SGCP

## ANNEX III Organizing Committee

<b>Scientific Committee</b>	<p><b>President:</b>  <b>Brigadier General Konstantinos Prentzas</b>          Commander, O.C./GSCP</p> <p><b>Members:</b>  <b>Lt Colonel (Army) P Anastopoulos</b>          Deputy Commander O.C./GSCP</p> <p><b>Director Anna Papakiriakou</b>          Directorate of International Relations, GSCP</p> <p><b>Captain Saini KN</b></p> <p><b>Dr Olga Kakaliagou</b>, Dpt of International Relations, GSCP</p>
<b>Program Scientific Responsible Report Editor</b>	<p><b>Dr Saini KN, Captain FCHQs</b>          Assistant to S.G.C.P.</p>
<b>Scientific Support Team</b>	<p><b>Dr Dimitris Pagidas</b>, Dpt of International Relations, GSCP</p> <p><b>Fivos Staboliadis</b>, Dpt of International Relations, GSCP</p>
<b>Secretariat</b>	<p><b>Nikolaos Moshovidis</b>, Dpt of International Relations, GSCP</p> <p><b>Fotini Mellou</b>, Dpt of International Relations, GSCP</p>
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